DNSSEC for the Root Zone

NANOG 48 Austin, TX
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This design is the result of a cooperation between ICANN & VeriSign with support from the U.S. DoC NTIA
Roles and Responsibilities
ICANN
IANA Functions Operator

- Manages the Key Signing Key (KSK)
- Accepts DS records from TLD operators
- Verifies and processes request
- Sends update requests to DoC for authorization and to VeriSign for implementation
DoC NTIA
U.S. Department of Commerce
National Telecommunications and Information Administration

- Authorizes changes to the root zone
  - DS records
  - Key Signing Keys
  - DNSSEC update requests follow the same process as other changes

- Checks that ICANN has followed their agreed upon verification/processing policies and procedures
VeriSign
Root Zone Maintainer

- Manages the Zone Signing Key (ZSK)
- Incorporates NTIA-authorized changes
- Signs the root zone with the ZSK
- Distributes the signed zone to the root server operators
**DNS records** sent from TLD operator to ICANN

**Verified data** sent to DoC

**Authorized data** sent to VeriSign

**Root Zone** distributed to root servers

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**ICANN**

- **TLD Operator**
  - **RZM**
  - **DoC**

**VeriSign**

- **Unauthorized root**
  - **Signer**
  - **Signed root**

**Root Servers**

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**KSK published by ICANN**

- **KSK Management**
  - **ZSK sent from VeriSign to ICANN**
  - **Keyset is signed by KSK and sent back from ICANN to VeriSign**

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Deployment
Goals

• Deploy a signed root zone
  ▸ Transparent processes
  ▸ Audited procedures
  ▸ DNSSEC deployment
    • validators, registries, registrars, name server operators

• Communicate early and often!
Anticipated Issues
DO=1

• A significant proportion of DNS clients send queries with EDNS0 and DO=1

• Some (largely unquantified, but potentially significant) population of such clients are unable to receive large responses

• Serving signed responses might break those clients
Rollback

- If we sign the root, there will be some early validator deployment
- There is the potential for some clients to break, perhaps badly enough that we need to un-sign the root (e.g., see previous slide)
- Un-signing the root will break the DNS for validators
Staged Deployment
Deploy Incrementally

• The goal is to leave the client population with some root servers not offering large responses until the impact of those large responses is better understood

• Relies upon resolvers not always choosing a single server
• Deploy conservatively
  ‣ It is the root zone, after all

• Prevent a community of validators from forming
  ‣ This allows us to unsign the root zone during the deployment phase (if we have) to without collateral damage
• “Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone”
• Sign RRSets with keys that are not published in the zone (but with matching keytag…)
• Publish keys in the zone which are not used, and which additionally contain advice for operators (see next slide)
• Swap in actual signing keys (which enables validation) at the end of the deployment process
DURZ

. 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 (AwEAAa+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
THIS/KEY/AN/INVALID/KEY/AND/SHOULD
/NOT/BE/USED/CONTACT/ROOTSIGN/AT/ICANN/DOT/ORG/FOR/MORE/INFORMATION+++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++/
+/
) ; Key ID = 6477
# Deploy Incrementally

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Measurement

- For those root servers that are instrumented, full packet captures and subsequent analysis around signing events
- Ongoing dialogue with operator communities to assess real-world impact of changes
Testing

- A prerequisite for this proposal is a captive test of the deployment
  - Test widely-deployed resolvers, with validation enabled and disabled, against the DURZ
  - Test with clients behind broken networks that drop large responses
Interaction with TLDs
DS Change Requests

• Approach likely to be based on existing methods for TLD managers to request changes in root zone

• Anticipate being able to accept DS requests 1-2 months before the validatable signed root zone is in production

• Current topic of discussion within Root DNSSEC Design Team
Communication
Project Web Page

- http://www.root-dnssec.org
  - Status updates
  - Documents
  - Presentation Archive
  - Small collection of links to relevant tools
  - Contact information
  - RSS
Communication
with non-technical audiences

• Will reach the non-technical and semi-technical audiences with press releases and other means.

• PR departments with people who know how to do this will be engaged.
Communication

with technical audiences

• Reaching the technical audiences via mailing lists and other means

  ▸ IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNSOP)
  ▸ non-IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNS-OARC)
  ▸ General operator lists (e.g. NANOG)
  ▸ ...

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Draft Timeline

• December 1, 2009
  ‣ Root zone signed
    • Initially signed zone stays internal to ICANN and VeriSign
    ‣ ICANN and VeriSign begin KSR processing
    • ZSK and KSK rolls

• January - July 2010
  ‣ Incremental roll out of signed root

• July 1, 2010
  ‣ KSK rolled and trust anchor published
  ‣ Signed root fully deployed
Documentation

- Requirements document posted
- High-Level Architecture, Policy and Practice Statements, Trust Anchor Publication, Deployment documents posted in draft form
- Ceremony, KSK Facility Requirements, Testing documents expected to be posted soon

http://www.root-dnssec.org
Testing

• Data collection testing by Root Server Operators complete - have now done this for real
• Several KSR/SKR exchanges complete
• DURZ vs. Resolver testing complete
DURZ Roll-Out

• L and A root servers are running the DURZ

• M and I will make the transition next week.
Other zones

ARPA, IN-ADDR.ARPA, IP6.ARPA

Work on how to sign these zones is happening and reasonable progress is expected.
Thoughts?

- Feedback is extremely welcome
  - Email to rootsign@icann.org
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